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Introduction: the basic theory
During much of the second half of the 20th century 
the disappearance of distributional questions from the 
mainstream economic literature created little disquiet, 
because the experience of the period seemed consistent 
with the notion that market economies could combine 
growth and reasonable equality, without needing anything 
more than the normatively-driven apparatus of the welfare 
state to redistribute income at the margin in favour of the 
less fortunate. But now political economy is back. Thomas 
Piketty (2014) has breathed new life into the proposition 
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that capitalism shares with 
other economic systems 
an inherent tendency for 
wealth and power to become 
concentrated in the hands 
of a narrow elite, and for 
the resulting inequality to 
become entrenched through 
inheritance. That tendency is 
found historically in all sorts 
of non-capitalist economic 
systems, from the city states 
of the ancient Middle East 
(with their ruling castes of 
kings, warriors and priests) 
to the modern-day family 
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oligarchy of North Korea. The challenge 
for observers of capitalism over the past 
couple of centuries has been to determine 
whether capitalism as an economic 
system generates dynamic equalising 
forces to offset the age-old disequalising 
human pursuit of concentrated power 
and wealth. 
Piketty’s answer is no. If one takes 
away the redistributive apparatus of 
the welfare state, along with the other 
particular factors (wars, revolutions, the 
Great Depression, and sustained rapid 
growth) that made the 20th century an era 
of unprecedented equality, the equations 
that describe the underlying dynamics 
of capitalism, combined with some 
plausible propositions about ownership 
of wealth, predict the re-emergence and 
entrenchment of dynastic elites holding 
a commanding share of the economy’s 
wealth, and collecting – as the return on 
that wealth – a substantial rental share 
of the national product. In the long run, 
Piketty argues, capitalism and equality can 
coexist only if the disequalising dynamics 
of wealth accumulation are checked by 
collective will. 
Limiting inequality is therefore a 
central and permanent task for democratic 
government. Piketty’s main policy 
conclusion is: ‘If we are to regain control 
of capitalism, we must bet everything on 
democracy’ (Picketty, 2014, p.573). So:
(1) Have ‘we’ lost control of capitalism? 
(2) Is uncontrolled capitalism truly 
headed towards gross inequality and 
the oligarchy of a patrimonial rentier 
class?
These surely are questions to which 
mainstream neoclassical economics ought 
to have ready answers.
Piketty has made such an impact on 
the professional world of economists 
precisely because he has politely but 
firmly pointed out that the ready answers 
are not forthcoming. At the same time he 
has made such an impact on the general 
informed public because his work has 
appeared at a time when inequality 
and growth are central issues in the 
public mind, and the answers offered 
by mainstream economists are widely 
recognised to be unsatisfactory.
Neoclassical economics – the dominant 
school of economic thought throughout 
the 20th century – grew out of the great 
19th-century debates over the justice of 
distributional outcomes under capitalism. 
The neoclassicals’ marginal-productivity 
theory of income distribution asserted 
that in a competitive market system each 
of the aggregate inputs to production – 
labour, capital, land, entrepreneurship 
– would be paid in line with its direct 
productive contribution, satisfying the 
essential test of justice in distribution 
of the product. As one of the leading 
developers of the theory put it,
[W]here natural laws have their 
way … free competition tends to 
give to labor what labor creates, to 
capitalists what capital creates, and to 
entrepreneurs what the coordinating 
function create … To each agent a 
distinguishable share in production, 
and to each a corresponding 
reward – such is the natural law of 
distribution … 
The welfare of the laboring 
classes depends on whether they 
get much or little; but their attitude 
toward other classes – and, therefore, 
the stability of the social state – 
depends chiefly on the question, 
whether the amount that they get, 
be it large or small, is what they 
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produce. If they create a small 
amount of wealth and get the 
whole of it, they may not seek to 
revolutionize society; but if it were 
to appear that they produce an 
ample amount and get only a part 
of it, many of them would become 
revolutionists, and all would have 
the right to do so. (Clark, 1899, 
paragraphs I.5-I.7, emphasis added).
For the neoclassical story to have 
credibility in explaining the share of the 
product going to ‘capital’, there would 
have to be a clear long-run relationship 
between capital accumulation and growth 
of the product. The historical statistics 
do not show this (see Figure 1). Equally, 
there would have to be a clear relationship 
between labour productivity and real 
wages; in practice that relationship has 
been missing, at least since the 1970s (for 
the New Zealand case, see Figure 2 and 
Rosenberg, 2015).
Piketty simply sets aside the 
neoclassical hypothesis that the primary 
income distribution flows from the 
production process. He replaces it with 
the proposition that ‘capital’ – defined 
to include all assets that yield a reliable 
stream of income, regardless of whether 
they are directly involved in productive 
activity or not – exercises a direct claim 
to appropriate a share of the product 
that is determined not by productive 
contribution but rather by the stock 
of accumulated wealth multiplied by 
the long-run rate of return on wealth 
of 4–5%. The wealth-owners’ claim is 
simply rent, and it is taken not in return 
for active productive effort but as a 
property right, enforced by the laws and 
institutions of private property. Because 
this rent claim is prior to any other 
claims, the non-wealth-owning part of 
the population is left to share out what 
is left of the product after the rentiers’ 
claim has been met; only at this second 
stage does the marginal-productivity 
theory have potential bite.
The owners of wealth comprise two 
groups: those who have worked to earn 
their fortunes, and those who have simply 
inherited their wealth (Warren Buffet’s 
‘lucky sperm club’). As today’s working 
entrepreneurs and chief executives 
age they become rentiers, and as their 
heirs take over their wealth, the right to 
collect rents continually drifts away from 
whatever original basis private fortunes 
may have had in productive endeavour.
Of course, if all wealth (‘capital’) were 
collectively-owned and the rents equally 
shared, inequality would not follow from 
a rising rent share. But private property 
in wealth, combined with a tendency 
towards concentration of its ownership 
(which Piketty predicts on the basis of 
economies of scale and scope in the 
management of wealth portfolios) imply 
an increasing division of the population 
into haves and the have-nots, until an 
equilibrium is established in which the 
ratio of wealth to output is stable. The 
identification of this equilibrium has 
been Piketty’s central new contribution 
to economic theory (Bertram, 2014).
Suppose Piketty is right. Then the 
possible long-run outcomes can be 
mapped on John Rawls’ prescient diagram 
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(Rawls, 1971, Figures 6 and 8, pp.76-7; 
Rawls, 2001, Figure 1, p.62; see Figure 3).
The diagram relates the size of the 
total product to its distribution, showing 
that over a range of ‘social cooperation’ 
from O up to M the welfare of all can be 
expanded (economists call this a ‘pareto 
gain’). Beyond M (Rawls’ ‘maximin’, 
where the welfare of the poorest is 
maximised), the benefits of any further 
economic expansion go only to the rich. 
In addition, further welfare gains for the 
rich can be secured by redistributing 
income upwards at the expense of the 
poor. At the extreme point F lies the 
social order that Rawls characterises as 
‘feudalism’, where the rich cannot be 
made better off however hard the poor 
are squeezed.
Piketty’s theoretical model identifies 
an equilibrium for wealth accumulation 
and consequent income inequality that 
lies somewhere along the Rawls line – 
potentially (but not necessarily) between 
M and F. The big political issue Piketty 
identifies is whether this equilibrium 
inequality lies inside or outside the limit 
of democratic ‘tolerance’. If the Piketty 
equilibrium is to the left of point T, then 
it is politically as well as economically 
sustainable. If it is to the right of T, then 
political unsustainability implies eventual 
‘euthanasia of the rentier’ by some means 
– either a moderate programme of asset 
taxes along the lines Piketty proposes, or 
a more drastic, potentially revolutionary, 
rupture in the social fabric. The tolerance 
threshold itself, of course, is not 
necessarily fixed over time; the political 
aim of any oligarchy is to shift it right 
in the diagram, while pro-poor policy 
activism shifts it left.
The New Zealand dimension 1: incomes
Piketty’s work has been focused on the 
large developed economies, and the 
economic dynamics he identifies operate 
primarily in those economies, with 
global ramifications as the spillovers 
from large-country trends flow through 
global markets. For a small country on 
the capitalist periphery, the basic policy 
choice is whether to live with those 
spillovers, or to insulate the local economy 
and society from them. New Zealand has 
conspicuously opted to remain wide open 
to global forces, and it is therefore not 
really surprising that Piketty’s historical 
data show distributional trends in this 
country to have been strongly driven from 
offshore. Figure 4 traces the income share 
of the top 1% in the five ‘Anglo’ economies, 
while Figure 5 shows the inverse Pareto 
coefficient (Piketty’s preferred statistical 
measure of inequality) for the same group 
of countries. These charts show that New 
Zealand, along with Australia, has been 
swept along by the rising global tide of 
inequality since 1980. 
Figures 4 and 5 need to be read in 
conjunction with the now-familiar graph 
of the New Zealand Gini coefficient since 
1982, reproduced in Figure 6. The sharp 
upward step change in income inequality 
in New Zealand between 1987 and 1994, 
with strong concentration of income at 
the very top end of the distribution, is 
evident in all three charts. What Figures 
4 and 5 make clear is that this was simply 
a case of follow-the-leaders, after a few 
years in the mid-1980s when New Zealand 
lagged behind the dramatic overseas 
Figure 4: Income share of the top 1% in Anglo-Saxon countries and Holland 
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Figure 5: Inequality in English-speaking countries 1910-2011
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increases in inequality under Reagan and 
Thatcher in the United States and United 
Kingdom respectively.
Galling as it may be for New 
Zealanders who like to think we make 
our own history, it appears that Roger 
Douglas and Ruth Richardson were 
not so much big policy innovators as 
simply pawns in the new global order. 
Rather than initiating big economic 
changes, their key contribution as finance 
ministers was to facilitate rather than 
resist global spillovers. Their deregulation, 
privatisation, slashing of benefit levels, 
union-busting and destruction of 
collective bargaining simply sufficed to 
keep New Zealand in line with the rest 
of the Anglo realm. Countries that did 
not join the early drive to inequality – 
for example, the continental European 
countries and Japan – were ones whose 
policy elites resisted the neo-liberal policy 
tsunami (Atkinson and Piketty, 2007; 
Atkinson, Piketty and Saez, 2011). Lack 
of pushback against imported neo-liberal 
dogma was the central feature of New 
Zealand policy making in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s.
The New Zealand dimension 2: wealth
While public discussion of Piketty’s work 
has focused mainly on the distribution of 
incomes, the long-run core of his model 
is the accumulation and concentration 
of rent-yielding wealth, which is what 
he calls ‘capital’. Piketty charts the long-
run evolution of his ‘capital’ relative to 
national income for the large developed 
economies, including Australia for 1970–
2010, but not New Zealand (Piketty, 2014, 
part 2). To fill this gap I have constructed 
Table 1 combining Reserve Bank figures 
on private household wealth with data 
on the net worth of government from the 
Crown accounts, and the international 
investment position as measured in the 
national accounts, all measured in years 
of GDP (shown here as percentages of 
annual GDP). This procedure replicates 
in essence the methodology used for 
Australia by Piketty and Zucman (2014; 
data set at http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/ 
files/capitalisback/Australia.xls, accessed 
19 September 2014). Household and 
government net wealth are at June of 
each year,1 while the GDP figures used 
as denominator are for March years, and 
the international investment position 
is at March of each year. These timing 
discrepancies imply only minor distortions 
in the overall figures. Government net 
worth was not reported prior to 1993 but 
was below 10% of GDP, which is negligibly 
small relative to private wealth, which was 
around 250% (two and a half years) of 
GDP in the mid-1990s. 
Table 1 and Figure 7 show the 
results. The productive capital stock as 
conventionally measured is shown also, 
to emphasise the distinction between 
Piketty’s definition of ‘capital’ and the 
conventional measure used for national 
accounting purposes.
Figure 7 makes clear two key points in 
the application of Piketty’s model to New 
Zealand:
•	 The	housing	stock	is	the	largest	
component of total wealth, as is true 
of all the other countries studied by 
Piketty. It comprises 53% of total 
Source: data 1982–2004 from Perry, 2014a, Table D9, p.9; 2007 on from Perry, 2014b, Table D.10, p.109
20
25
30
35
40
45
1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 2012
G
in
i c
oe
ffi
ci
en
t 
x1
0
0
Figure 6: Gini coefficient for household disposable income after housing costs, 
under four administrations 1982-2012 
Gini coefficient Trend (3-year average) 
Labour
1984-90
National
1991-1999
Labour
2000-2008
National 
2009-2014
Working
for Families
2010 tax
cuts
Employment
Contracts Act,
Mother of all
Budgets 
Income tax
changes,
imputation 
GST
Figure 7: New Zealand wealth data 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
1
9
5
0
1
9
5
2
1
9
5
4
1
9
5
6
1
9
5
8
1
9
6
0
1
9
6
2
1
9
6
4
1
9
6
6
1
9
6
8
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
4
%
 o
f G
D
P
Foreign-owned assets Government net worth Other household net assets Housing
'Productive' capital stock Rich List wealth National wealth excl foreign-owned assets
Page 44 – Policy Quarterly – Volume 11, Issue 1 – February 2015
‘capital’ in New Zealand, compared 
with 64% in Australia, 57% in 
Britain, 61% in France, 56% in 
Germany, 42% in the US and 51% 
in Canada (data from http://piketty.
pse.ens.fr/files/capital21c/en/xls/). 
Analyses of inequality in wealth 
distribution, and the consequent 
distribution of the rent share of the 
product, therefore need to focus 
particularly on ownership of the 
housing stock.
•	 There	is	a	sharp	upward	step	change	
visible in Figure 7 between 2002 and 
2008. This came a decade later than 
the step change in income inequality 
seen in Figure 6; as one would 
expect, wealth inequality flowed 
from and followed on from the sharp 
increase in income inequality. The 
radical change in the distribution of 
after-tax income in the early 1990s 
raised the savings capacity of the top 
income groups while squeezing the 
lower income tiers out of saving – 
indeed, into negative saving in many 
cases (see Figure 9). Consequently, 
when the boom in wealth during 
the 2000s occurred, driven by rapid 
capital gains as well as by savings of 
high-income recipients, the benefits 
were very unequally distributed, 
entrenching the advantages of the 
wealthiest groups. One indicator of 
this is the NBR Rich List’s wealth, 
which rose from less than 2% of 
total wealth in 1989 to 8% by 2013. 
(While not statistically robust, the 
Rich List does capture the very top 
end of the wealth distribution, and 
the evidence it offers of growing 
concentration is plausible.)
When the 1980–2014 New Zealand 
series for Piketty’s beta (total ‘capital’ 
measured as a percentage of GDP) 
are arrayed alongside Piketty’s capital-
stock data for other countries we obtain 
Figure 8, which shows that in wealth 
accumulation as in income distribution, 
New Zealand has been closely tracking 
the trend in the other Anglo economies.
Saving and the distribution of wealth 
ownership
Having shown that there are very strong 
convergence forces at work pulling New 
Table 1: New Zealand wealth data
Percentage of GDP
Year Household net wealth
Government 
net worth
Total 
net 
wealth
Net foreign 
holdings 
of New 
Zealand 
assets
Total net 
wealth 
excl. 
foreign 
holdings
NBR 
Rich 
List 
wealth
Orthodox 
capital 
stock
Housing Other Total
1980 193 na 193 36 157 354
1981 201 na 201 34 167 350
1982 210 na 210 38 172 334
1983 219 na 219 46 173 336
1984 232 na 232 47 185 331
1985 240 na 240 66 173 320
1986 250 na 250 63 186 11 307
1987 242 na 242 74 169 14 293
1988 231 na 231 63 167 7 282
1989 226 na 226 63 163 4 278
1990 222 na 222 62 161 4 279
1991 222 na 222 63 159 5 284
1992 229 na 229 69 159 5 290
1993 238 10 247 82 165 4 288
1994 244 7 250 81 170 6 282
1995 250 5 255 79 175 7 281
1996 253 4 257 74 183 7 278
1997 259 7 266 80 187 7 276
1998 259 10 269 86 183 8 274
1999 158 104 262 6 268 82 185 9 277
2000 147 101 248 8 255 78 178 10 274
2001 143 97 240 10 250 74 175 11 272
2002 146 89 235 14 249 67 183 12 266
2003 171 87 258 21 279 67 212 14 268
2004 209 88 297 28 324 70 254 16 274
2005 232 89 320 35 356 72 283 20 281
2006 245 94 339 52 390 73 317 22 290
2007 269 100 369 57 426 76 349 23 297
2008 234 91 325 57 382 75 307 24 294
2009 223 92 314 53 368 86 282 21 308
2010 228 93 321 50 371 80 290 20 301
2011 216 95 312 40 352 67 285 23 292
2012 219 95 315 29 343 71 272 28 290
2013 238 105 343 32 375 71 304 30 292
2014 223 98 321 33 354 65 289
Sources: Household wealth and GDP from Reserve Bank of New Zealand Tables C18 and C21 at http://www.
rbnz.govt.nz/statistics/. Government net worth assembled from annual Crown financial statements. Net 
foreign holdings 1980–88 from Colgate and Stroombergen, 1993, Table 1, pp.14-15; 1989–2000 
from Infoshare IIP001AA, and 2001 on from IIP025AA. National Business Review Rich List assembled 
from the annual publications. Capital stock to 1985 from Philpott, 1995, Appendix Tables 1–3, and 
1986–2013 from Infoshare SND186AA.
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Zealand into line with the capitalist 
core countries in terms of the aggregate 
capital–income ratio and the distribution 
of income, a final note is in order 
regarding the local dynamics of wealth 
accumulation. 
Data on saving and household 
borrowing confirm that household 
indebtedness has risen very sharply 
since the benefit cuts and wage-lowering 
labour market changes of the early 1990s. 
The Reserve Bank’s figures on household 
balance sheets2 show their financial 
liabilities steady at about one-third of GDP 
from 1978 until 1989, but then surging to 
106% of GDP in 2007, on the eve of the 
global financial crisis. While some of this 
increase in borrowing was due to home 
owners cashing in on increased equity 
as house prices rose, a substantial part 
is likely to be due to distress borrowing 
by low-income households struggling to 
maintain their previous living standards.
Strongly suggestive of the way in 
which the sharp increase in income 
inequality in 1988–94 has affected the 
saving capacity of different groups, and 
hence their ability to accumulate wealth, 
are the results of a Statistics New Zealand 
decomposition of the savings data in 
the 2007 national accounts, shown in 
Figures 9 and 10. These show very large 
dis-saving by the bottom two quintiles 
of the income distribution, and negative 
aggregate savings for both wage and salary 
earners and transfer recipients. Positive 
savings were concentrated in the top 
income quintile, and among the groups 
receiving income from property income 
and self-employment, most notably the 
former. Since Piketty’s total capital grows 
both by savings and by capital gains, 
the combined effect of concentrated 
savings and capital gains to those already 
holding assets is likely to have been in the 
direction of increasing concentration of 
private wealth.
Conclusion
Although the broad outlines of New 
Zealand’s distributional trends have 
been imported (along with a neo-liberal 
policy stance) from the global economy, 
it is possible to identify the specific local 
mechanisms at work here that have 
reproduced the trends in global capitalism 
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Figure 9: HH gross saving (LH scale) and saving rate (RH scale) by quintile
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Figure 10: Gross saving (LH scale) and saving rate (RH scale) by main income source
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identified by Piketty. As an open economy 
on the global periphery, New Zealand may 
have less policy freedom than the core 
economies (where, Piketty acknowledges, 
even his mild asset-tax proposals look 
‘utopian’ in the current climate of 
corporate freedom to face down national 
governments and accrue profits in tax 
havens). Times do change, however, as 
Piketty’s account of the 20th-century 
golden age of growth and relative equality 
under the democratically-constrained 
‘mixed economy’ makes clear. Capitalism 
and equality can coexist – just not in a 
policy climate of deregulated laissez-faire 
and low taxation. Economic growth and 
prosperity do not require gross inequality 
of income or wealth – rather, the opposite 
(Ostry, Berg and Tsangarides, 2014) – and 
wider local policy options should open 
up as the tide of global opinion swings 
against neo-liberalism. 
It is not clear at this point, however, 
how great the tolerance of the New 
Zealand public for growing inequality 
will prove to be (see Morrison, 2015). 
The 2014 election results seem to indicate 
that the limits of democratic tolerance 
have not yet been approached. But if 
the disequalising dynamics predicted 
by Piketty continue to run their course 
overseas, the case for re-establishing a 
more autonomous policy realm in this 
country can be expected to strengthen.
1 Prior to 1998 the Reserve Bank of New Zealand household 
wealth series are at December of each year; for the purposes 
of Table 1 I have estimated the June figure as the mid-point 
of the preceding and following December numbers. 
2 http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/statistics/tables/c18.
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